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Executive Summary 
 Global monetary authorities remained steadfast in policy normalization to pare unconventional easing programs 
 Federal Reserve’s balance sheet run-off and China’s BRI loans created a perfect storm in dollar liquidity tightening 
 Risk-parity funds are in the grip of a pincer movement, with rising reflationary pressure from globalization’s retreat 
and tighter dollar liquidity spur deleveraging flows and deny investors safe harbors from cross asset risk shedding 
 Short-covering and flight-to-quality flows to long-maturity Treasuries increased vulnerability to risk parity unwind 
 Some investors view tighter financial conditions as signs of “policy error” after past decade’s policy easing, but BIS 
cautioned that FCIs’ sensitivity to equities may induce policymakers to place excess weight on stock valuations, 
overstate easy financial conditions’ benefits, and overlook the distributional effects of monetary accommodation 
A new bearish catalyst on risk-parity investments 
isk-parity and leveraged funds are facing a new threat in the form of global dollar liquidity shortage. This came at 
a time when leveraged multi-asset portfolios already experienced several waves of risk-parity unwind as global 
monetary authorities pared policy support. As a result of the year-end 2018 volatility spike, mounting losses and 
heavy redemption forced AQR to rebrand its risk-parity fund and removed its risk-parity namesake under pressure: 
 
For risk-parity funds, leverage was initially celebrated as an equalizer to prevent risky assets from dominating portfolio 
returns. Bridgewater Associate’s risk-parity white paper highlighted leveraged holdings of less volatile assets can dampen 
aggregate portfolio volatility, such as large leveraged bond holdings would offer better risk-adjusted returns than equities 
due to former’s absence in imbedded leverage. Unfortunately, risk-parity funds came to popularity following the financial 
crisis, and they thrived during an era of suppressed volatility thanks to concurrent balance sheet expansions. 
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While the threat of reflation-induced volatility spike is well-known risk-parity funds and leveraged investors, this catalyst 
was absent during the year-end 2018 capitulation. Ordinarily, higher probability of lower inflation and lower growth would 
energize Treasuries (classic secular stagnation trade), but the 10-year Treasury yield only retreated to August levels at a 
time when SPX and credit spreads had erased more than a year of gains. 
The combination of momentum risk-off and relatively muted strength in dollar-denominated interest rate instruments 
can be best explained by a global dollar liquidity shortage. There are two factors fueling this liquidity crunch, with the first 
being Federal Reserve’s balance sheet unwind, which is draining the supply of dollar liquidity as designed: 
 
The second source of dollar liquidity shortage is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which increased global demand for 
dollar. By year-end 2016, China’s three biggest state-owned banks had provided a total of $225 billion in credit for the BRI 
projects, and the country’s two policy banks have also extended $200 billion in loans (these amounts would have risen 
since); due to countries’ cool reception to renminbi funding, large amount of BRI loans were denominated in dollar terms.  
In order to fund BRI loans, Chinese banks were seen sourcing dollar deposits from domestic channels; once the loans were 
made, foreign countries would have to acquire dollar to service the debt. On-going tightening by the Fed would impose 
the following hurdles: 
 Chinese banks would face greater challenge to facilitate dollar lending as domestic dollar availability declined 
 Foreign borrowers would need to acquire dollar to service BRI loans, and large dollar liabilities would create 
challenges for local central banks, for easier local monetary policy would make dollar debt more costly to service 
As a result of the aforementioned dynamics, tighter liquidity supply and greater demand would strengthen the dollar, and 
a 2017 BIS working paper highlighted dollar valuation’s impact on shadow cost of bank balance sheet capacity: 
 A weaker dollar would flatters the balance sheet of dollar borrowers, whose liabilities fall relative to assets, and 
the stronger credit position of borrowers would reduce tail risks in the creditor’s portfolio and create spare 
capacity for additional credit extension despite constraints 
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 A stronger dollar increases the shadow cost of bank balance sheet capacity, reduces the supply of dollar credit 
and increases CIP deviations (downward pressure on cross currency basis, or higher premium of using non-dollar 
currency to fund dollar borrowing), and reflect higher price of bank leverage as a result of a stronger dollar 
Under this framework, BRI-related dollar demand and further Fed balance sheet normalization would lead to higher cost 
of leverage and reduce hedge funds’ ability to take risk. As a result, dollar-denominated leveraged investments would 
weaken to trigger risk-parity unwinds. This would exert greater impact on Treasuries and corporate bonds because they 
are beneficiaries of leverage in order to match risk characteristics of equities despite latter’s smaller notional value. 
Tariff-induced reflation risks persist 
In addition to dollar liquidity shortage as a risk factor, leveraged investments and risk-parity positions continue to face 
risks of reflationary pressure. Latest BIS research highlighted that studies on globalization and price trends suggest cross-
border trade exerts downward pressure on inflation. Furthermore, countries under the study saw increased co-movement 
of national economic data as trade partnerships aided the rise of global value chains (GVCs). This implies that individual 
central banks have been partly reacting to global trends rather than idiosyncratic developments in respective economies:  
 
Under this backdrop, rising protectionism can be seen as a reflationary catalyst, which is negative to leverage investments 
expecting muted volatility and easy financial conditions (risk-parity trade). Thus, risk-parity funds are in the grip of a pincer 
movement from global dollar liquidity shortage and retreat in globalization. 
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Safe haven assets struggle to hedge against risk-off 
As a result of flight-to-quality flows and market participants capitulating from their reflationary thesis, Treasury positions 
are more balanced following several waves of short-covering. Positioning data suggest investors have largely pivoted away 
from reflation trades in light of heightened volatility: 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth putting the magnitude of short-covering into context. If unwinding more than half of the 
accumulated short positions in 10-year Treasuries following a 17.5% decline in SPX would result in only 43 bps of rally, 
then one can argue Treasuries would act as a less effective risk hedge at a time when many investors are already long 
(more potential for renewed duration shedding on rising cost of leverage and higher inflation). 
Finally, the Japanese yen has been exhibiting a bearish bias as Fed balance sheet unwind hastened its pace. The currency 
subsequently became more sensitive to risk-on rallies and less reactive to flight-to-quality flows: 
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Logic trap and laments over “policy error” 
Investors conditioned by past decade’s policy-driven volatility suppression were caught unprepared by the momentum 
sell-off; rather than crediting balance sheet expansion and policymakers’ “whatever it takes” pledge for the longest bull 
market in history, some in the investment community instead attributed the relentless rally to “economic fundamentals” 
and investors’ “rigorous bottom-up analysis.” While illogical, this nevertheless makes sense, for crediting central banks for 
past performances would dent the mystique of “fundamental investing” and question the merit of fostering relationships 
to enhance access to corporate leadership. 
As market sentiments fell, some market participants shifted to regard the on-going normalization as “policy error.” It is 
ironic to credit “strong fundamentals” for the bull market, but market rout would be the fault of monetary policy despite 
passive balance sheet unwind was communicated well ahead of sentiment shifts. In other words, there were plenty of 
opportunities for markets to de-risk and react to policy guidance, but many instead mistook the symptom of policy easing 
as “economic fundamentals” and remained steadfast in “yield-seeking” to move up the risk ladder. 
The “policy error” thesis is also rooted in the view that equity valuation plays a key role in the transmission of monetary 
policy to the real economy, with the transmission mechanism also known as financial conditions. In the latest BIS quarterly 
report, researcher Zabai highlighted financial conditions indices’ sensitivity to equity valuations:  
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At the same time, Zabai expressed concern that officials may risk overstating economic boost signaled by easy financial 
conditions and overlook distributional effects, for equity ownership are concentrated in affluent households with lower 
marginal propensity to consume: 
“The high sensitivity of FCIs to equity valuations under this methodology points to the importance of 
appropriately setting the corresponding weights. Some degree of reliance on market-based finance in 
funding economic activity, as well as the tendency of corporations to look to the equity market as a signal 
in their investment decisions, calls for equities to be included in FCIs. Against this, the short-term 
macroeconomic relevance of equity market developments could be overstated if distributional 
considerations do not inform the choice of weights. Equity holdings are concentrated among households 
at the top end of the income and wealth distributions, which tend to have a relatively low marginal 
propensity to consume. As a result, an index constructed without accounting for these differences may 
place too high a weight on equity valuations, thereby possibly overstating the boost in activity 
foreshadowed by a loosening of financial conditions.” 
Consistent with the thesis that widening inequality as a result of prolonged unconventional easing would generate support 
toward political insurgents (and induce anti-establishment policy shifts such as retreat from global trade), “policy error” 
is not tighter policy but the scenario noted in Zabai’s thesis: policymakers overstate economic benefits of buoyant risk 
sentiment despite distributional effects. Overlooking this factor would induce officials to cater to investors’ anti-volatility 
bias by prolonging highly distributional policies. This was already seen in quantitative easing programs’ immediate effect 
in boosting asset prices (benefiting affluent households and business entities with access to the capital market), while 
households with less asset ownership would await “trickle-down” benefits over policy’s “long and variable lags,” such as 
tighter labor market conditions overtime. 
This roundabout dynamic from stimulative monetary policy to the rise of populist insurgents cornered some investors in 
a logic trap: they prefer a return to the post-Crisis monetary policy status-quo (“policy error” avoided), yet it was precisely 
such status-quo that gave rise to the present political vitriol and seething discontent from “left behind America” and anger 
from the “Yellow Vests.” It was the growth of wealth inequality that led to calls for “People’s QE” or “Helicopter Money,” 
which would demand monetary authorities to permanently cede policy control to fiscal authorities. 
While it is tempting for some to attribute anti-establishment support to insufficient education or workers’ “reluctance to 
re-tool,” one would have to face political and economic consequences no matter whose “fault” it is. In other words, the 
path to avoid “policy mistake” means more “Yellow Vests” and “Tariff Man” in the days to come, for accommodative 
monetary policies (and the desire to avoid “policy error”) are far from costless. 
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